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Abstract— Advanced Persistent Threats or APTs are big 
challenges to the security of government organizations or industry 
systems. These threats may result in stealth attacks, but if the 
attack is confronted before the attacker end goal has been 
achieved, the attackers could become aggressive by changing the 
mode of attack or by resorting to some form of contingency plan, 
which might cause unexpected damage. Therefore, the attack 
detection and the notification to the system administrator should 
be done surreptitiously. This paper presents an architecture, 
called Kidemonas, to silently detect the threat and secretly report 
it to the user or the system administrator. This way the attacker is 
deceived into carrying out the attack, without sending any clear 
signal so that the defender can buy time to develop 
countermeasures to deal with the attack. We consider several 
attack scenarios and perform a security analysis to demonstrate 
the features of Kidemonas. 
Keywords— Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), Computer 
Security, Cryptography, Cyber-security, Trusted Platform 
Module (TPM) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Emerging economies with huge population are experiencing 
a growth in the Internet penetration among the masses [1].  
These economies have seen a steep rise in the smart-phone 
ownership among the common masses, but advanced economies 
not only have access to better technologies but also experience 
higher rates of usage of the technologies [1] [2]. The common 
man, the industry, the corporate world and the government 
agencies are heavily dependent on the Internet based 
technologies. This is a matter of grave concern in terms of cyber-
security. Recently many government agencies as well as the 
industry have experienced a rise in cyber-attacks [3] [4]. 
The cyber-attacks are known to have been staged for 
financial gains as well as to steal sensitive information, and 
perform disruptive functions in the system or manipulate the 
outcome of sensitive processes. There can be different types of 
attacks and threats. This paper looks into a particular type of 
threat known as the Advanced Persistent Threat or APT.  
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) is a type of stealthy attack 
wherein first the attacker stealthily infiltrates the system, gathers 
information, performs reconnaissance missions, and once ample 
information is available and needed access privilege has been 
achieved, it carries out the attack. APT campaigns are carried 
out against companies, government agencies and even 
individuals. APTs are often targeted attacks, may use state-of-
the-art technologies, and if not taken care of, they can maintain 
privileged access to the system for long-terms causing further 
damage to the system. The attacker can be anyone, any 
individual, part of an organization (some of which are working 
outside legal boundaries), or nation state actors. Sometimes 
these aforementioned attackers work in isolation and at other 
times they collaborate. With the easy availability of Malware-
as-a-Service (MaaS) platforms, these attackers are able to use 
sophisticated techniques to mount targeted attacks [8] [14]. 
Detecting an APT in a system is a daunting task. APTs 
infiltrate stealthily and remain dormant till they deem it suitable 
enough to carry-out the task. Sometimes it takes days to years 
before an attack is discovered. Once an APT infiltrates the 
system, it installs backdoors to communicate with the command 
and control (C&C) centers via TCP port 443 [15]. If the attacker 
figures out that the attack has been detected then the attacker 
might become more aggressive or change the mode of attack or 
resort to some form of a contingency plan, which might cause 
unexpected damage. This paper, therefore, presents an 
architecture for silently detecting the infiltration of an APT 
malware and to secretly report it to the user or the system 
administrator as a first layer of defense. Our architecture, called 
Kidemonas, makes use of a hardware resource called the Trusted 
Platform Module or TPM. TPM provides a Trusted Execution 
Environment within which an APT malware detection system 
can be implemented. Once an APT malware is detected, TPM 
secretly reports it to the system administrator and the attacker is 
deceived into carrying out the attack without knowing that the 
detection has taken place. The contribution of this paper is an 
architecture that uses deception to provide ample time to the 
defender to come up with a countermeasure without alarming 
the attacker who might resort to dangerous contingency plans if 
discovered. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II of the paper 
gives a background of the hardware resource, TPM. Section III 
of the paper discusses the threat model used in this paper. 
Section IV describes the Kidemonas architecture. Section V 
analyzes the security of the architecture. Finally, Section VI 
concludes the paper. 
II. BACKGROUND 
TPM or Trusted Platform Module is a hardware module built 
along the lines of the specifications laid down by the security 
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group, the Trusted Computing Group [9].  TPM renders quite a 
few cryptographic capabilities to the system, including the 
generation of cryptographic keys, random number generation 
and the safe keeping of the user’s cryptographic credentials. 
Currently the main uses of TPM include platform integrity, safe 
keeping of the keys used for disk encryption and password 
protection [10]. TPMs are also used in digital rights 
management, protection and enforcement of software license, 
and in the prevention of cheating on online activities by 
providing remote authentication capabilities. 
The general specifications, which are laid down, by the 
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) for TPM are generally meant 
for the implementation of the hardware-based TPM. But the 
industry has also tried implementing TPM as a software only 
module, more or less having the similar capabilities. The actual 
architecture of TPM is a bit more complex but Figure 1 shows a 
simplified schema of TPM [7]. 
 
Figure 1: A simplified Schema of TPM [7] 
The cryptographic processor consists of four main units as 
shown in Figure 1. The random number generator is used for 
different purposes depending upon the user process. The RSA 
key generator produces private and public RSA key pairs for 
different sessions. If any user process demands hashing, the 
SHA-1 hash generator produces the hash for the process. 
Encryption-Decryption signature engine produces RSA digital 
signatures. TPM, broadly speaking, has two memory units, 
namely, Persistent Memory and Versatile Memory. 
Endorsement Key (EK) is a pair of public-private keys which 
are created and permanently embedded in the memory by the 
vendor at the time of manufacture. The Storage Root Key (SRK) 
is a pair of public-private keys invoked when a user takes 
ownership of the TPM. The SRK is unique to each user and is 
used for user authentication. If a user gives up the ownership of 
a TPM then he/she flushes the SRK and a new SRK is generated 
for the new user who acquires the ownership of the TPM. The 
SRK and EK are stored inside the Persistent Memory. 
Now coming to the Versatile Memory part, as shown in 
Figure 1, it has the Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs), 
Attestation Identity Keys (AIK) and the Storage Keys. PCRs are 
16-bit registers which store the configuration of the platform. 
Any deviation from the known configuration indicates a 
compromise in the platform integrity. The Endorsement Keys 
are used for platform authentication. The Public Key part of the 
Endorsement Key is available to all but the Private Part of the 
Endorsement Key never leaves the TPM and thus can be used 
for authenticating the platform. The SRK are used by the user to 
authorize any activity that is taking place inside the TPM.  
Intel Software Guard Extension (Intel SGX) and ARM 
TrustZone, take the aforementioned capabilities of TPM a step 
further. They provide a Trusted Execution Environment [11] 
[12] [13]. This environment which Intel names Enclave [11], is 
inaccessible to any instructions from outside, not even the high 
priority OS instructions running at the kernel have access to it. 
Only the processes authorized by the user are allowed to run in 
the trusted environment. Most of the devices today are available 
with an in-built TPM unit. But the TPMs in different devices 
come in different incarnations, depending on the manufacturer 
producing them. For example, in late 2015, Intel introduced 
SGX in their sixth generation core microprocessors based on 
their Skylake microarchitecture [31]. 
TPM is generally used to check for platform integrity. It also 
provides cryptographic capabilities. But its usage has been 
mostly passive. This paper leverages the capabilities of the TPM 
and the concept of the Trusted Execution Environment to design 
the hardware-based security system and the deception 
mechanism. 
III. THREAT MODEL 
An APT malware doesn’t carry-out the attack right away 
after the infiltration but the attack typically takes place in 
multiple stages. The “Cyber Kill Chain” model, which has been 
patented by Lockheed Martin, gives an idea about the life cycle 
of an APT attack [16]. The APT life cycle conceived by 
Lockheed Martin consists of 7 stages. LogRhythm on the other 
hand considers a 5 stage APT life cycle [17] and Lancaster 
University considers a 3 stage APT life cycle [18]. 
Considering the aforementioned APT life cycles, and reports 
from [20] and the model used in [19], we summarize and 
consider the following APT life-cycle for the Kidemonas 
Architecture. 
 Initial Reconnaissance and Compromise: The attacker 
gathers information regarding the target and stealthily 
infiltrates by exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities, 
through social engineering, phishing, malware on 
frequently visited web-pages, etc.  
 Establish foothold: In this stage the attacker installs 
backdoors, Trojans, etc., to communicate with the 
command and control (C&C) centers. 
 Escalate privileges: In this stage the attacker gains 
administrative or root privileges, install rootkits for 
long-term accesses, and gains ample knowledge for 
password cracking. 
 Internal reconnaissance: In this stage the attacker 
collects internal information and communicates them 
to the command and control (C&C) centers. 
 Move laterally: In this stage the attacker searches for 
and compromises more internal systems. 
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 Maintain presence: In this stage the attacker 
surreptitiously maintains a control over the 
compromised system, without raising an alarm in the 
system.  
 Complete mission: In this stage the attacker finally 
carries out the attack which can be stealing of sensitive 
information, carry-out disruptive processes, 
subverting the mission when the time is suitable or 
resorting to a contingency plan if needed. 
 
Stuxnet is one of the first APT malware that received an 
attention that spanned worldwide [26].  In the following years, 
few more APT malwares were discovered, such as Duqu and 
Flame. They belong to the same family as Stuxnet [26] and are 
more complex and aggressive in nature as compared to Stuxnet. 
The authors of [28] believe that Duqu might have been created 
by the creators of Stuxnet. The authors of [27] analyzed Duqu 
and came to the conclusion that Duqu heavily reuses the Stuxnet 
code. Stuxnet scans for Siemens Step7 software in the 
computers with Windows OS which are used for controlling 
PLCs. If it discovers the software then would introduce 
unexpected commands on those software, otherwise it would 
remain dormant. Duqu, even though it heavily re-uses the 
Stuxnet source code, looks for information and stealthily steals 
it. It can be used for specific payload delivery as well. It more 
aggressively looks for Windows vulnerabilities to achieve the 
desired results. These discoveries bolster our assumption that 
discovery of a given APT malware may force the attackers to 
resort to more aggressive attack models. Having looked into 
different APT attack models, we consider a dynamic threat 
model. A typical APT may or may not have a contingency plan. 
But we assume that the threat model we are dealing with, will 
always have a contingency plan. 
In our model, the APT will begin attack with the “Initial 
compromise” stage and end with the “Complete mission” stage. 
After the initial infiltration, the APT malware installs a backdoor 
to establish a communication channel with the command and 
control (C&C) centers so as to take orders for further processes 
to be executed. A typical APT executes the contingency plan in 
the “Complete mission” stage but this paper assumes an APT, 
which has the capability to execute the contingency plan, if at all 
it has one, at any stage, whenever it realizes that it has been 
detected. The information regarding a detection of the malware 
is forwarded to the C&C center. The C&C center then might 
resort to the contingency plan. We assume that if the threat is 
detected in the very first stage of the attack, then the contingency 
plan of the attacker is to abort the mission. In the event of 
attacker being successful in completing the first phase of the 
mission stealthily, then it goes to complete the second phase of 
the mission, i.e., installing backdoors and establish a foothold in 
the system. If the threat is being detected in this stage and the 
C&C center of the attack is informed about the same, then the 
contingency plan can be either to abort the mission or to change 
the mode and the target of the attack so as to camouflage the 
initial attack. In the later stages, if the attack is being detected 
then the attacker would not resort to mission abortion, instead it 
changes the type of attack and/or even the target to become more 
aggressive and execute the mission quicker than before, giving 
no time to the defender to deal with the attack. 
The aforementioned threat model considered in this paper is 
more dangerous and difficult to deal with as compared to the 
threat posed by a typical APT malware attack which comes with 
no contingency plan. Therefore, we present a deception 
mechanism to camouflage the reporting of the malware 
detection information, so that the attacker carries on with the 
initial mode of attack, without resorting to more aggressive 
forms of attack. 
IV. KIDEMONAS: THE ARCHITECTURE 
A. Trusted Computing: Security in Plain Vanilla Form 
Trusted computing has been thought of as a probable 
solution to the defense against various cyber-threats [23]. In [22] 
the authors tried to leverage the functionalities of trusted 
computing to detect any attack. They relied heavily on constant 
monitoring of the system and checking the integrity of the 
platform regularly. In the event of any intrusion being detected, 
the system raises an alarm. This alarm is also visible to the 
attacker. The attacker then can change the mode of attack to take 
some aggressive measures or can resort to some other form of 
contingency plan for which the defender may not be prepared 
and the system can suffer unexpected damage. In [21] the 
authors present a model wherein the TPM is given an added 
functionality to communicate via the link layer communication 
channels to other nodes in a networked system. But it also raises 
an alarm whenever any form of intrusion is being detected and 
that alarm is visible to all. Therefore considering the 
implications of the aforementioned threat detection alarms, we 
present Kidemonas, an architecture to silently detect any threat 
and surreptitiously reporting it to the system administrator. 
B. Kidemonas 
Deception is an important part of the defense mechanism in 
cyber-security. The authors of [29] present a software security 
solution wherein the elements of misdirection and deception are 
introduced using honey-patches. But our architecture, 
Kidemonas, uses hardware components, as shown in Figure 2, 
to introduce the deception scheme. By camouflaging the 
infiltration detection system, the attacker is deceived into 
believing that it is successful in maintaining its stealth, and it 
buys ample time for the defender to come up with 
countermeasures to thwart the attack. To maintain the cover, the 
traffic is analyzed in a concealed environment. Therefore, an 
encrypted copy of the incoming traffic is sent to our hardware-
based security system, and it is in this unit where the malware 
detection system analyzes the traffic and surreptitiously reports 
it to the user or the system administrator. The following sub-
sections discuss the working of each unit as the traffic flows 
through it. 
1) The Firewall 
The first line of defense of a system would be the firewall of 
the system, which acts as a fence and keeps away the malicious 
actors from the system. But in an event of the breach of the 
perimeter or in this case breaching the firewall of the system can 
pose serious threats to the system. APT malware infiltrates the 
system stealthily, so it can be assumed that the attacker would 
be able to pass through the firewall.  
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Figure 2: Kidemonas Architecture 
2) The Crypto-Box 
After passing through the firewall, the traffic enters the 
crypto-box, as shown in Figure 2. The crypto-box is used for 
encrypting the data traffic entering the system. The first task of 
the crypto-box would be to make a copy of the data traffic 
entering the system and then to encrypt the copied traffic and 
sending it to the hardware-based TPM. The crypto-box is 
configured to encrypt the copied traffic using the RSA-OAEP 
scheme. The original copy goes to the system as intended. 
3) The Hardware-based TPM  
The encrypted traffic then goes to the hardware-based 
security system which comprises of a hardware-based TPM unit. 
This unit, along with various cryptographic capabilities also 
provides an isolated and exclusive execution environment or the 
enclave, which even the high priority OS instructions do not 
have access without user authentication. The idea is to 
implement the APT Detection System within this execution 
environment. Any form of infiltration detected by the system, 
which is running inside the enclave can be communicated to 
other nodes in the network using the Peer Communication Units 
(PCUs) as shown in Figure 2. The encrypted traffic can be stored 
outside the system to further analyze the malware or the attack 
so that security patches can be produced at the earliest. 
Any traffic going inside the TPM doesn’t come-out and it 
behaves like a black-hole. The encrypted traffic entering the 
TPM, is decrypted using the private key of the TPM. For the 
hardware-based TPM, the security heavily depends on how 
securely the private keys are kept hidden. The APT Detection 
System running inside the TPM analyzes the received traffic and 
detects any form of infiltration by the APT malware, if it has 
taken place. 
4) The APT Detection System 
The architecture has been designed in a way that any state-
of-the-art APT malware detection system, which is compatible 
with the system, can be installed within the concealed 
environment of the hardware-based TPM. Security Information 
Event Management (SIEM) and User Behavior Analytics 
(UBA) are popular APT malware detection schemes [14]. The 
SIEM scheme collects information from different events 
occurring in different components of the system, and looks for 
security flaws. This scheme might blow the cover of the 
deception mechanism. But any scheme which analyzes the 
incoming traffic, like big-data analytics [30], can be installed in 
Kidemonas for APT malware detection.  
5) The PCU Network 
 
Figure 3: Peer Communication Unit [21] 
Peer Communication Units (PCU) [21] are the Link-layer or 
Layer 2 units, which interact with other nodes in the systems via 
Layer 2. The PCU of one node interacts with the PCU of the 
other, forming a PCU network as shown in Figure 3. The PCU 
of a given node interacts only with its hardware-based TPM. 
Once the APT Detection System, running inside the hardware-
based TPM, detects any form of intrusion, it communicates the 
information to the other nodes in the system through the PCU 
network. The PCU network actually provides a different 
communication intra-network link within the system, which is 
inaccessible to any entity, and is not a part of the system. Even 
the OS running on each node won’t have access to this PCU 
network. 
6) The Deception Mechanism 
The deception mechanism comprises of an alert, which is 
covertly raised without letting the attacker know that an alert has 
been raised. It is achieved by camouflaging the alert as a normal 
traffic between the TPM and the user or the system 
administrator. The TPM would send two signals at every 
interval to the user or the system administrator. The two signals 
are: Time Stamp and a Random Signal of bit-strings of 0s and 
1s. The time stamp will be in the 24-hour format. Since, most of 
the OS being used today use 64-bit bus, the random bit string 
will be 64-bits long. At the event of an infiltration being 
detected, the TPM will generate a time-stamp and use the hour 
part of the time-stamp as the recognizing bit. For example, if the 
hour part of the time-stamp is 09, then the bit number 9 of the 
random string will be set as 1 as well as, (63-9) or the bit number 
54 would also be set as 1. In the event if no infiltration being 
detected and the hour part of the time stamp is 09, then the bit 
number 9 of the random string will be set as 0 as well as, (63-9) 
or the bit number 54 would also be set as 0. The user or the 
system administrator will just check the bit number n and the bit 
number (63-n), as the bits are numbered from 0 to 63, and would 
realize if there has been any intrusion or not. The infiltration 
detection is being camouflaged in the randomness of the bit 
string. 
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY OF KIDEMONAS 
A. The Deception Mechanism 
The most significant aspect of the security provided by 
Kidemonas is the deception mechanism. Considering the 
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different stages of the APT life cycle (discussed in Section III), 
the security provided by Kidemonas is analyzed in detail. 
Kidemonas won’t be able to deter the attackers in the first three 
stages. The attacker will be able to perform initial 
reconnaissance and infiltration, establish a foot-hold and 
escalate the privileges. But it won’t be able to perform internal 
reconnaissance, and move and compromise internally as far as 
the Kidemonas unit is concerned. Each time the infiltrated 
malware receives any command or information from the C&C 
centers, Kidemonas would receive the same without the attacker 
knowing about it. Since, the attacker doesn’t know about 
Kidemonas, and no alarms are being raised on infiltration, it 
would believe that it has successfully and stealthily 
compromised the system. Therefore, neither the attacker would 
become aggressive nor would resort to the contingency plan. 
This would buy ample time for the defender to come up with a 
patch or better security features, before the attacker achieves the 
last stage, i.e., the mission completion stage. This would help 
the victim to avert any major damage. 
B. The Crypto-Box 
The Crypto-box uses the RSA-OAEP scheme to encrypt the 
traffic being sent to the hardware-based security unit. It could 
use the public-key portion of the endorsement key (EK) of the 
TPM to encrypt the traffic. Now, RSA-OAEP according to [24] 
and [25] is chosen cipher-text attack (CCA) secure under the 
RSA Assumption. This would camouflage the copy of the traffic 
going in to the security unit. Moreover, as discussed earlier, the 
private key portion of the endorsement key of the TPM never 
leaves the TPM and the security heavily depends on how the 
endorsement key is kept secret. Therefore it would not be 
possible for the attacker to have a better knowledge of the 
private key than a random guess. 
C. The PCU Network 
Another important aspect of the Kidemonas architecture is 
the PCU network. This network connects the PCUs of each node 
in the system. It communicates the information regarding the 
infiltration of an APT malware to other nodes as well. This 
communication takes place without the knowledge of the 
attacker. In a networked system, if one node of the system is able 
to detect an infiltration, then the entire system is made aware of 
the same. This helps the entire system to stop the attacker from 
wreaking havoc and the damages can be minimized to a great 
extent. 
D. The Trusted Execution Environment 
Last but one of the most significant contributions of the 
Kidemonas architecture along with the surreptitious reporting 
scheme is that it also provides a trusted and isolated execution 
environment wherein any state-of-the-art APT malware 
detection system can be implemented. With time the APT 
malwares would become more resourceful and might deceive 
the existing malware detection systems. The APT malware 
detection system can be updated manually for newer and more 
advanced threats. This flexibility of system upgradation makes 
the architecture robust against becoming obsolete in the face of 
newer and more advanced form of threats. 
E. The Security Overview in Presence of a Threat 
Now, taking an example of the threat model, the 
effectiveness of the Kidemonas architecture can be discussed. 
The threat model perceived in this paper is a dynamic one, which 
comes with a contingency plan and has the capability to resort 
to the contingency plan any time it deems necessary and the 
trigger for such a scenario is the information being conveyed to 
the attacker that it has been detected by the system. The attacker, 
if detected in the very first phase, may abort the mission. This 
doesn’t give time to the defender to learn about the attack in 
details. Kidemonas, surreptitiously informs the system 
administrator regarding the attack, and the attacker is deceived 
into carrying out the attack. This gives the defender ample time 
to study about the attack, during its entire life-cycle and stop the 
attacker from giving the final blow in the very last stage, as by 
then the defender would be well armed and ready to thwart the 
attack. In the second stage, the APT malware installs a backdoor 
to communicate with the C&C centers of the attack. If 
discovered in this stage, the attacker can either abort the mission 
or resort to more aggressive means. Both the scenarios are 
disadvantageous to the defender. In the former case, it doesn’t 
get ample time to study the attack and in the latter case, it is not 
ready for a more aggressive form of attack. But, with 
Kidemonas, camouflaging the infiltration report, the attacker is 
made to believe that no detection has taken place. This gives 
defender enough time not only to study about the attack but also 
about the attacker by studying and analyzing the communication 
traffic between the malware and the C&C centers. This might 
also help the defender to be prepared not only for the current 
form of attack but also for any aggressive contingency plan the 
attacker might have. Similarly, for the later stages of the attack, 
the attacker is still deceived into believing that the system is 
unable to detect its threat and doesn’t give the attacker any time 
to resort to the contingency plan, when the defender thwarts the 
attack in a well prepared manner in the final stage of the attack. 
F. The Weakness 
But no design is completely secure and each comes with its 
own share of weaknesses. The biggest concern for the 
Kidemonas architecture is the insider threat. As of now it is very 
hard to deal with insider attacks. In a networked system, if the 
attack happens from one of the nodes, then the entire system is 
compromised. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We analyze the threat from APT malware and consider an 
aggressive form of threat model for designing a security system 
against such an attack. We present Kidemonas, an architecture 
of a deception mechanism. The future work for this paper would 
be forming a test-bed and analyzing the architecture in the 
presence of a real-life threat. It is not always easy to work with 
real TPMs as different manufacturer come with different 
specifications and introducing changes at firmware levels as 
well as OS level would not be very cost effective. So, initially 
our architecture would be implemented on emulators available 
commercially for the developers. Once a robust model is 
prepared, the next step would be to implement the architecture 
on real hardware. To begin with, it would be a single node 
system but with time the system will be scaled up to a multiple 
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node networked system. The Kidemonas architecture presented 
in this paper can also be used for other kinds of threats (subject 
to testing and analysis). One of the most important application 
of Kidemonas can be in the field of cloud computing. 
Kidemonas can be used to take care of the trust issues as well as 
infiltration from an attacker. 
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